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Puzzled by the experimental results of the ’impunity game’ by Bolton
& Zwick (1995) we replicate the game and alter it in a systematic manner.
We ﬁnd that although almost nobody actually rejects an oﬀered equal split
in a bargaining game, proposers behave as if there would be a considerably
large rejection rate for equal splits. This result is inconsistent with existing
models of economic decision making. This includes models of selﬁsh play-
ers as well as models of social utility and reciprocity, even when combined
with erroneous decision making. Our data suggests that subjects fail to
foresee their opponent’s decision even for one step in our simple bargaining
games. We consider models of bounded rational decision making such as
rules of thumb as explanations for the observed behavioral pattern.
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Bolton & Zwick (1995) test the explanatory power of the punishment hypo-
thesis for ultimatum games. This hypothesis states that proposers choose a
fair distribution of the pie because they fear that the responder will reject a
more greedy oﬀer. In order to test this hypothesis, Bolton & Zwick (1995)
compared a cardinal ’impunity’ game with a cardinal ultimatum game. In
these games the proposer has only two choices: an unequal split (’up’) and an
equal split (’down’). The responder can either accept or reject the proposal.
On acceptance both players get the outcome proposed by the ﬁrst mover. In
the ultimatum game a rejection of a proposal leads to zero payoﬀs for both
players. In the impunity game, this is only true for a rejection of the equal
split. For the unequal split, the responder can only reject his own income,
while the proposer gets his share anyway (see Figure 1). In the experiment,

















Figure 1: The ultimatum game (a) and the impunity game (b) from Bolton & Zwick
(1995).
Bolton & Zwick (1995) report about 35% of standard theory equilibrium
play (’up’/’up’) in the ultimatum game, but 98% in the impunity game, there-
fore conﬁrming the punishment hypothesis. However, the result of the impunity
game is surprising in light of the usual experimental results of the dictator game,
where the second player cannot reject any proposal but has to accept it. Under
this condition 20-30% equilibrium play is normally observed in other experi-
mental studies (see for instance Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin & Sefton (1994)).
One explanation for this inconsistency might lie in the asymmetry of re-
jection power in the impunity game, i.e. that the responder is not allowed
to reject the unequal split, but has the power to reject the equal split. In a
footnote Bolton & Zwick (1995) argue:
2”We might also consider the argument that ﬁrst movers desire fair-
ness but that they opt for the higher payoﬀ in Impunity because
they fear that second movers will turn down an oﬀer of the equal
split, a risk that is not taken if the higher payoﬀ is chosen. But
we see no reason why the ﬁrst mover would think that the second
mover would turn down the equal split.”
In other words: It is hard to think about motives for rejecting an equal
split. If the proposer anticipates this, he should think of the impunity game as
a dictator game.
In a follow-up paper, Bolton, Katok & Zwick (1998) ’reconciled’ the data
of the impunity game with the argument, that the outcome of (’up’/’up’) with
the speciﬁed sequence of h allocates 25% of the overall pie in the experimental
session to the second player, which corresponds with their observations in other
dictator experiments.
In this paper, we explicitly test the relevance of asymmetric rejection power
in cardinal bargaining games. Our main hypothesis, based on the argument of
Bolton & Zwick (1995), is that there is no impact of the responder’s rejection
power for the equal split on the proposer’s behavior. We ﬁnd, that while actually
responders do not reject the equal split, about 35% of the proposers behave
as if a non-negligible share of responders would reject an equal split. This
observation is inconsistent with existing economic models of behavior, including
models which allow for fairness concerns, reciprocity or errors. We propose
decision heuristics stemming from research on individual decision tasks and
bounded rationality to explain our data.
Section 2 presents our experimental design, and Section 3 describes the
procedures of the experiment. In Section 4 we analyze the data, while Section 5
discusses the results in light of theories of bounded and unbounded rational
decision making, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Experimental design
We designed 5 games, which diﬀer only in the rejection power of the responder:
one dictator game, three impunity games and one ultimatum game.
The ﬁrst game, Γ1, is a replication of the original impunity by Bolton &
Zwick (1995). Player 1 can decide between an equal and an unequal distri-
bution. Player 2 may accept or reject the oﬀer. When player 1 chooses the
unequal split, player 2 can only reject his own income, but cannot diminish
player 1’s outcome. When player 1 proposes the equal split, player 2 has full
3punishment power, and a rejection leads to zero payoﬀs for both. Figure 2(1)
shows the extensive form of this game.
Figure 2(2) shows the cardinal dictator game, Γ2. Player 2 has to accept
player 1’s oﬀer, he has no possibility to change the distribution by choosing
up or down. Although in this game the forking of the game tree is of course
not necessary at the second stage, we keep it for comparability with the other
ﬁgures and for similarity of the instructions in all games.
The next game, Γ3, is a symmetric version of the original impunity game
and visualized in ﬁgure 2(3). Here player 2 looses rejection power also for the
equal split, i.e. if he rejects an oﬀer, player 1 still gets his proposed share, while









































Figure 2: The 5 games: the original (asymmetric) impunity game Γ1 (1), a dictator
game Γ2 (2), a symmetric impunity game Γ3 (3), an ultimatum game Γ4 (4), and a
conversely asymmetric impunity game Γ5 (5).
Figure 2(4) shows a cardinal ultimatum game, denoted as Γ4. Player 1 can
propose an equal split or an unequal split. Subsequently player 2 can either
accept this oﬀer or reject it. If player 2 accepts the oﬀer, both get the share
player 1 proposed. If player 2 rejects, both get nothing.
Last, in Γ5 we change the asymmetric rejection power of Γ1. Here the
responding player 2 can only reject his own payoﬀ for a proposed equal split,
while he has the full rejection power if an unequal split is chosen. Figure 2(5)
visualizes this.
In the remainder of this paper, we will denote the share of proposers choosing
the unequal split as ai, the share of responders accepting the unequal split as bi,
and the share of responders accepting the equal split as ci, with i ∈ {1,2,3,4,5}
corresponding to the game number.
4The hypothesis put forward by Bolton & Zwick (1995) implies that there
is no diﬀerence in proposer’s behavior in games Γ1, Γ2 and Γ3. The same is
true for games Γ4 and Γ5. The reasoning behind this hypothesis is based on
the assumption that responders do not reject an equal split and that proposers
rationally anticipate the responder’s behavior.
Hypothesis 1
a1 = a2 = a3 > a4 = a5
1 = b1 = b2 = b3 > b4 = b5
1 = c1 = c2 = c3 = c4 = c5
However, if there is an impact of the asymmetric rejection power, i.e. the
fact that a responder has the possibility to reject an equal split in some games,
we might observe something else. The counter hypothesis is that the share of
proposers choosing ’up’ is bigger in Γ1 than in Γ3, and bigger in Γ4 than in Γ5,
as well as that there is no diﬀerence in proposer behavior in Γ2 and Γ3.
Hypothesis 2
a1 > a2 = a3 > a4 > a5
3 Experimental Procedures
To test our hypotheses we decided to use the strategy method introduced by
Selten (1967), where subjects are asked for their decisions conditionally on
(some) experimental parameters.1 In particular, each subject had to decide for
all 5 games ﬁrst in the role of the proposer and then in the role of the responder.
To avoid order eﬀects in the data, the order of the 5 game forms was random
for both roles. To present the game in the instructions and decision forms
we used a box representation similar to Bolton & Zwick (1995). Particulary,
participants saw the box graph printed in Table 1. Participant A in the role of
the proposer ﬁrst chooses ’up’ or ’down’, then participant B in the role of the
responder chooses ’left’ or ’right’. To avoid biases the position of the standard
game theoretical equilibrium (unequal split/accept) rotated within the games.
In Γ1 it was located at the lower right corner, in Γ3 in the upper right, in Γ4 in
the upper left and in Γ5 in the lower left corner. Γ2 was presented as game Γ4.
1For a discussion and test of the appropriateness of the strategy method for studying
bargaining behavior see Brandts & Charness (2000).
5In all games, the size of the pie was 8 Euro, i.e. the proposers had always to
decide between an unequal split of (6.40,1.60) and an equal split of (4.00,4.00).
Translation of directions, instructions, and questionnaires can be found in the
Appendix.
left right
up Participant A gets: XX Euro Participant A gets: XX Euro
Participant B gets: XX Euro Participant B gets: XX Euro
down Participant A gets: XX Euro Participant A gets: XX Euro
Participant B gets: XX Euro Participant B gets: XX Euro
Table 1: The box representation on the decision forms
We also asked participants for their expectation what the majority of all
other subjects may choose in the same game and role. To avoid incentive
incompatibilities, we did not provide monetary incentives for right guesses.2
However, asking for expectations should force subjects to think about opponent
choices.
The experiment was conducted in April 2003 in the foyer of the student’s
restaurant at the University of Jena, Germany. Figure 3 shows a graph of the
physical setup of the experimental session. Participants were volunteers who
were recruited by leaﬂets and oral communication by an experimenter (denoted
as ’!’ in the ﬁgure) at the entrance of the restaurant. They were asked to
participate at an experiment with monetary reward performed on the spot.
First, a student who wanted to play had to give her name and address to
experimenter ’i’. She received a code card and a form asking for gender, age,
ﬁeld of study, and semester, and was guided to a free table at the wall. After
having ﬁlled in the personal data form she received the instructions. She was
informed that it is forbidden to communicate with other people during the
experiment except the experimenter ’X’ for asking questions. At the end of
the instructions the subject had to answer a questionnaire testing for proper
understanding. When the questionnaire was ﬁlled in correctly, she received the
ten randomly ordered decision forms. The subject was asked to ﬁll in the forms
subsequently from top to bottom.
Having completed the forms, the subject kept her code card, put the decision
forms back into the envelope and put the envelope in a box. She was informed
that she can receive her money about 30-40 minutes later.3
2Particulary, providing monetary incentives for stated expectations might drive risk averse
participants to hedge risks between the real game and the expectations task, e.g. in the
ultimatum game Γ4 choosing ’up’ as proposer, but ’expecting’ rejection for responders.
3Most subjects were just going to lunch in the restaurant and received their money right
6Figure 3: The organization of the experiment.
Every 30 minutes the experimenter ’?’ opened the box and put the collected
envelopes in a second, open box. To determine payoﬀs, we used the following
procedure:
• First, the experimenter ’?’ took two envelopes out of the box and placed
them on the table.
• Second, he threw a 10-sided dice. If the number was odd, the ﬁrst envelope
represented the proposer and the second envelope the responder, and vice
versa for an odd number.
• If the number was 1 or 2, game Γ1 was chosen for the determination of
payoﬀs, if it was 3 or 4, Γ2 was chosen, and Γ3, Γ4, and Γ5 for 5 or 6, 7
or 8, and 9 or 10, respectively.
• Third, the experimenter ’?’ opened both envelopes. He took the decision
forms corresponding to game and role selected and calculated the payoﬀs.
Then, he wrote down code, game number, role, and the opponent’s deci-
sion on a payoﬀ form and handed it over to the experimenter ’$’ handling
the payoﬀs.
• This procedure was repeated until no more envelopes were in the open
box.
after.
7A participant coming back showed her code card and received the payoﬀ
form and money. She had to sign a receipt for the money earned.
Overall, the session lasted 310 minutes. 152 subjects participated. Five
participants did not show up to receive their payoﬀ. The remaining 147 subjects
earned an average payoﬀ of 3.74 Euro. They needed on average 12 to 15 minutes
to read the instructions, answer the questionnaire and ﬁll in the forms.
4 Experimental Results
For the data analysis we excluded the ﬁve participants who did not show up
to receive their payoﬀ as well as 2 participants who did not ﬁll in the decision
forms completely. Thus the analysis relies on 145 independent observations.
First we will analyze proposer behavior and then focus on responder behavior.
A detailed discussion of the results is provided in the next section.
Table 2 shows the observed frequencies of unequal split proposals and the
acceptance rates for unequal and equal splits for the ﬁve games.
Game Γi Γ1 Γ2 Γ3 Γ4 Γ5
impunity 1 dictator impunity 2 ultimatum impunity3
ai 0.800 0.676 0.710 0.552 0.283
bi 0.986 0.979 0.910 0.938
ci 1.000 0.979 0.993 0.993
Table 2: The observed frequencies of unequal split proposals (ai) and acceptance choices
for unequal (bi) and equal (ci) splits for the ﬁve games.
We observe 67.6% unequal split proposals in the cardinal dictator game Γ2,
compared to 55.2% in the cardinal ultimatum game Γ4. This is consistent with
the data observed in previous studies of ultimatum and dictator games. More-
over there are no big diﬀerences between the dictator game and the symmetric
impunity game Γ3, where we observe 71.0% unequal split proposals.
However, when we compare the dictator game Γ2 and the symmetric im-
punity game Γ3 with the asymmetric impunity game Γ1, where the responder
has punishment power for the equal split, we ﬁnd that more people oﬀer the
unequal split in the asymmetric impunity than in the dictator/symmetric im-
punity game. On the other hand, a comparison of the ultimatum game Γ4 with
the asymmetric impunity game Γ5, where the responder can only reject the
unequal split, yields that in the latter only 28.3% of the proposers choose the
unequal split, which is much lower than in the ultimatum game. In other words:
9% of the proposers change their choice between the asymmetric impunity game
8Γ1 and the symmetric impunity game Γ3, and 26.9% of the proposers diﬀeren-
tiate between the ultimatum game Γ4 and the asymmetric impunity game Γ5.
In both cases, the only diﬀerence between games is that the responder can resp.
cannot reject the equal split.
To test for signiﬁcance we conducted a Cochran’s Q test on the frequencies of
unequal split proposals (ai) of all ﬁve games i. A p-value of p < 0.001 indicates
that at least one proportion diﬀers from the others. Table 3 reports the results
of pairwise McNemar tests between diﬀerent ai’s. The test statistics conﬁrm
that a1 is bigger than a2 and a3, that a2 and a3 do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly, that
both are bigger than a4 and ﬁnally that a4 is bigger than a5 at a signiﬁcance
level of 0.05 or smaller. In summary, we have to reject hypothesis 1, while we
can conﬁrm the counter hypothesis 2.
N = 145 Chi-Square p
a1 & a2 6.881 0.009
a1 & a3 4.364 0.037
a2 & a3 0.457 0.499
a2 & a4 6.283 0.012
a3 & a4 9.878 0.002
a4 & a5 25.333 0.000
Table 3: Test statistics for pairwise McNemar tests on the share of unequal split
proposals, ai.
The share of acceptance of the unequal split, bi, is quite high for all games i.
In the games with full rejection power for the unequal split we have a rejection
rate of 9% and 6.2% in Γ4 and Γ5, respectively, while we have a minimal rejection
rate of 1.4% and 2.1% in the games where the responder can only reject his own
share of the unequal split, Γ1 and Γ3, respectively. Pairwise McNemar tests
show that b4 is smaller than b1 and b3 (p < 0.01 for both comparisons), and b5
is smaller than b1 (p = 0.039). On the other hand, b4 is not diﬀerent from b5,
and b1 is not diﬀerent from b3 (with p = 0.344 and p = 1.000, respectively).
Regarding the acceptance rate of the equal split, ci, we cannot ﬁnd any
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the ci’s (Cochran’s Q test, p = 0.223). In Γ1
every subject accepted the equal split, and in Γ3, Γ4 and Γ5 only 3, 1 and 1
subjects out of 145 participants rejected the equal split, respectively.4
4Regarding expectations, we have to report that most people guessed right when asked
which choice the majority of all other participants would choose. However, this data does
not contribute to the analysis of decisions, since we did not provide monetary incentives and
asked a diﬀerent question here.
95 Discussion
Our results show that although almost no responder rejects an equal split, the
fact that rejection power for the equal split does exist or does not exist has
an inﬂuence on the proposer’s decision. We will start analyzing the games and
observed behavior assuming rational players with stable preferences between
games. Rationality is understood here as the ability to calculate and maximize
(expected) utility and the use of it. First we discuss the responder’s choice (1),
next we study proposer’s behavior (2).
ad.1 We cannot imagine a reasonable deterministic model of the proposer
about the responder, which would predict that responders reject an equal
split. Models of this kind include the assumption of selﬁsh players as well
as social utility models like Fehr & Schmidt (1999), Bolton & Ockenfels
(2000) or Andreoni, Castillo & Petrie (2003)’s ’regular’ preferences. In
models of reciprocity as Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger
(forthcoming) it could be possible that responders reject an equal split,
particulary if the equal split is the worst outcome of all proposals from
the responder’s view and therefore perceived as ’unkind’. However, in our
games the equal split is always the best outcome for the responder and
therefore should not be rejected due to reciprocity.
In probabilistic models proposers may assume that responders have some
propensities to err. That means, that some responders might reject an
equal split.
ad.2 When proposers have a deterministic model about their responders, they
should make no diﬀerence between a game where there is rejection power
for the equal split and a game where rejection for the equal split is not
feasible.
However, things may be diﬀerent when the proposer thinks that the re-
sponder might err. An egoistic proposer does not care about errors in
responses to proposals of the equal split in a game with no rejection
power for the unequal split, as in our games Γ1, Γ2 and Γ3, because he
will always choose the unequal split maximizing his income. To prefer
the equal split in Γ5 while choosing the unequal split in Γ4 the egoistic
proposer’s subjective probability that the responder makes an error has
to be at least 37.5%.5
5The simple error model we use here states that the egoistic proposer expects the egoistic
responder to deviate from his optimal decision with some probability. To derive the number
above, we assume that the expected error in the response to the equal split is the same as the
10Fair proposers assuming egoistic or fair responders might even diﬀeren-
tiate between games Γ1 and Γ3. In a (hypothetical) model based on
a fairness utility function, where players expect that others may make
errors, there exist equilibria stating that proposers who are nearly indif-
ferent but slightly fair in the symmetric impunity game Γ3 might choose
the unequal split in the asymmetric impunity game Γ1, because they fear
an erroneous punishment to the equal split. The same holds true for Γ4
and Γ5. However, these equilibria only exist either for a marginal share
of the proposer population (the ones who are nearly indiﬀerent) or for a
relatively high expected error rate.
In game theoretical equilibria, (subjective) beliefs and observed decisions
must correspond to each other, i.e beliefs must be right. In our experiments
(almost) all responders accept the equal split proposal, and the share of par-
ticipants diﬀerentiating between games with and without rejection power for
the equal split is about 35%. Thus, our data cannot be covered by a model of
rational players with propensities to err. Weizs¨ acker (2003) observes incorrect-
ness of beliefs about other player’s rationality and propensities to err in normal
form games.
To sum up, our data is inconsistent with existing economic models assuming
rational decision makers that incorporate concerns for fairness or that allow for
errors. Thus our results call for alternative explanations. Experiments in eco-
nomics and psychology have shown that subjects often fail to deliberate about
other players’ strategy spaces, especially if backward induction is involved. Bar-
gaining games are the simplest form of backward induction experiments. It may
be true that even in our experiments participants do not think thoroughly about
the strategic properties of the game. They don’t play a game against rational
human opponents, they play a game against ’nature’.
In this context, it might be useful to look at individual decision theory.
While standard game theory assumes fully rational, not ’nature-like’ human co-
players, individual decision theory knows the opponent called ’nature’, which
acts independently of a players choice and may give unexpected answers. In
individual decision theory some heuristics were proposed to deal with uncer-
tainty about nature’s moves. One of these is the ’maximin’ rule (Wald 1950),
i.e. choosing the strategy which guarantees the decision maker the maximal
the expected error in the response to the unequal split. Then we calculate the expected error
rate for the unequal split in Γ5 which sets an egoistic proposer indiﬀerent to the certain equal
split.
11payoﬀ minimum.6 In our extensive form game world, playing the ’maximin’
strategy might mean that players ignore the (subjective) probability of reject-
ing the equal split, and just have an additional preference component for certain
outcomes. That is, players ’normalize’ the extensive form of the game, and see
the opponent as ’nature’. When combined with social utility, such model of
(bounded rational) decision making is capable to explain our data.
However, there might be other explanations of observed behavior. One is,
that ’having the last word’, i.e being the player who makes the last decisive
move, has some worth to experimental subjects. Another explanation might
be an item-wise comparison of alternatives. In the ultimatum game Γ4, for
instance, an oﬀer of an equal split is ’fair’, and the unequal split is ’not fair’.
But choosing ’up’ might yield a ’higher income’, and choosing down a ’lower
income’. In the asymmetric impunity game Γ5, there is an additional item
that the personal outcome of choosing ’down’ is ’certain’, and the outcome of
choosing ’up’ is ’uncertain’ to some extent.7
Another, very simple related hypothesis is that participants simply compute
unweighted averages over outcomes. Then, in the ultimatum game Γ4 the pro-
poser has to decide between an average of (40,10) when choosing ’up’ and (25,25)
when choosing ’down’, but when confronted with the asymmetric impunity
game Γ5, the choice is between (40,10) for ’up’ and (50,25) for ’down’. Fairness
utility functions with a preference order of u(50,25) > u(80,10) > u(25,25) or
u(50,25) > u(40,10) > (25,25) are easy to ﬁnd. Figure 4 gives the complete
picture.
Indeed, this explanation is also related to the (hypothetical) fairness plus
errors model of decision making mentioned above. The averaging rule of thumb
is equivalent to expecting a 50% error in the responder’s choice. But expla-
nations stemming from the assumption of bounded rationality do not require
stable equilibria. Here, players simply ignore the strategic aspects of the game.
The resulting advice which we can give to bargainers who ﬁnd themselves
as a responder in an ultimatum situation is that it is not only important to
communicate to the proposer that one will reject an unfair oﬀer, but also to
make clear that one will accept the fair one.
6As von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) have shown, for normal form strictly competitive
games, to which sequential bargaining games do not belong, playing ’maximin’ strategies
corresponds to the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.


















































Figure 4: The averaging outcome for the 5 games: asymmetric impunity game Γ1 (1),
dictator game Γ2 (2), symmetric impunity game Γ3 (3), ultimatum game Γ4 (4), and
conversely asymmetric impunity game Γ5 (5).
6 Conclusions
To test for the impact of asymmetric rejection power in bargaining games we
replicated the ’impunity’ game of Bolton & Zwick (1995) and altered it in a
systematic manner. We ﬁnd that although almost no responder actually rejects
an oﬀered equal split in a bargaining game, proposers behave as if there would
be a considerably large rejection rate for equal splits. This result cannot be
explained by existing models of economic behavior. Particulary, standard game
theory as well as models of fairness and reciprocity, even when combined with
erroneous decision making, are inconsistent with our data. Our results suggest
that subjects fail to foresee their opponent’s decision even for one step in our
simple bargaining games. We consider models of bounded rationalistic decision
making such as rules of thumb as explanations for the observed behavioral
pattern.
Further research might be devoted to explicitly measure beliefs of players
about their actual opponent’s behavior in the games studied here, since our
data does not allow to check for these. Results from such experiments should
indicate whether proposers form wrong beliefs or simply ignore strategic as-
pects in bargaining, that is ignoring their beliefs to (rationally) make their own
decision.
Other experimental designs to diﬀerentiate between explanations based on
bounded rationality might be feasible. As another extension, a repetition of the
games conducted in the experiment might indicate if subjects learn to perceive
13the games in a strategic context.
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16A Instructions and decision forms
A.1 Personal Data Form
Personal Data Form, Code: AIZ-637-S77
Gender: .... male .... female
Main ﬁeld of studies: ....................................................................




Welcome to this experiment conducted by the Max Planck Institute for Re-
search into Economic Systems, Jena. Please read these instructions carefully
and answer the understanding questions at the end of the instructions. Signal
the experimenter when you have ﬁnished.
During the experiment it is not allowed to communicate with other persons
but the experimenters. You have to ﬁll in the forms completely. If you do not
behave according to these rules, we will have to exclude you from the payoﬀs.
This experiment consists of 5 diﬀerent situations. In each situation 2 par-
ticipants interact with each other: Participant A and Participant B. In each
situation both participants see an arrangement of 4 boxes. In each box the
monetary payment for Participant A and the monetary payment for Partici-
pant B are given. This might serve as an example:
left right
up Participant A gets: .. Euro Participant A gets: .. Euro
Participant B gets: .. Euro Participant B gets: .. Euro
down Participant A gets: .. Euro Participant A gets: .. Euro
Participant B gets: .. Euro Participant B gets: .. Euro
17In each situation, ﬁrst Participant A chooses the row. That means by choos-
ing ’up’ or ’down’ he determines, if the upper or the lower row is relevant for
the payment.
After knowing the choice of Participant A, Participant B chooses the col-
umn ’left’ or ’right’. By this he determines which box from the row chosen by
Participant A is relevant for the payoﬀs.
One example: Participant A chooses ﬁrst. He chooses ’up’. Now, Partici-
pant B who gets to know Participant A’s decision chooses between ’up/left’ and
’up/right’. Participant B chooses ’left’. As a result, both Participant A and B
get their corresponding payoﬀ noted in the upper left box.
In this experiment you’ll have to decide in all ﬁve situations. First you will
decide in all ﬁve situations in the role of Participant A. Then you will be asked
for your decisions in all situations as Participant B, always for the case that
Participant A has chosen ’up’ and for the case that Participant A has chosen
’down’. In the end you will have ﬁlled in 5 situations x 2 roles = 10 decision
forms.
For the calculations of payoﬀs we will randomly match pairs of 2 partici-
pants. Then we will randomly choose one situation out of the ﬁve situations,
and will randomly assign the roles of the ’proposer’ and ’responder’ to the two
participants. When situation and roles are determined, the payoﬀ simply results
from the game instructions: We take the decision forms of the two participants
for the selected situation. The decision of the participant in role A determines
the row, the decision of the participant in role B the column of the payoﬀ box.
The payoﬀs in this box will be paid out in cash.
For the random draw to allocate situation and roles we will take a 10-sided
dice. We will (blindly) take two envelopes out of the box with the decision
forms. Then the dice is thrown once. If the number is even, the ﬁrst drawn
envelope represents Participant A, and the second Participant B. If the number
is uneven, roles are assigned vice versa: the ﬁrst envelope is Participant B, and
the second Participant A. If the number is 1 or 2, situation 1 is selected. If
it is 3 or 4, the selected situation is situation 2, if the number is 5 or 6, it is
situation 3, for 7 and 8 it is situation 4, and for 9 and 10 it is situation 5.
18That means, that exactly one out of the 10 decision forms you ﬁlled in will
be relevant for payoﬀ.
After you answered the questionnaire printed below, you will receive the
decision forms. Please ﬁll them in from top to bottom. After having ﬁlled in
everything, put the forms in the envelope and throw it in the big box. Keep
the code number for yourself. You will need it to receive your payoﬀ.
After 30-40 minutes, but at latest at 14:30 o’clock, please come back to the
experiment place. In the mean time we will randomly determine pairs, situa-
tions and roles. When you show up, we will inform you about which role and
situation was assigned to you and which decision the participant matched with
you has taken. Then you will give us your code card, and we will immediately
pay you in cash.
The identity of the participant matched with you will remain secret. Your
identity will kept secret, as well, meaning that your decisions are anonymous.
If you have any questions now or later during the experiment, please raise




Imagine the following situation:
left right
up Participant A gets: 4 Euro Participant A gets: 5 Euro
Participant B gets: 4 Euro Participant B gets: 3 Euro
down Participant A gets: 2 Euro Participant A gets: 7 Euro
Participant B gets: 6 Euro Participant B gets: 1 Euro
1. Assume, you are Participant B. The other person, Participant A, chooses
’up’. After you get to know Participant A’s decision, you choose ’right’. What
is your actual payoﬀ, if this situation is later selected for payoﬀ?
19...... Euro
2. Assume, you are Participant A, and you choose ’down’. Which of the
four boxes can Participant B choose now? Please cross the box(es).
.... upper left .... lower left .... upper right .... lower right
3. Assume, you are Participant A and you choose ’down’. Then Participant
B chooses ’left’. What is your payoﬀ?
...... Euro
A.4 Decision form proposer
Decision Form Code AIZ-637-S77 Situation 5
You are Participant A. You have to choose ’up’ or ’down’. Then, Participant
B will choose ’right’ or ’left’ from the selected row.
The payoﬀ in cash will be determined as follows:
left right
up Participant A gets: 6.40 Euro Participant A gets: 6.40 Euro
Participant B gets: 1.60 Euro Participant B gets: 1.60 Euro
down Participant A gets: 4.00 Euro Participant A gets: 4.00 Euro
Participant B gets: 4.00 Euro Participant B gets: 4.00 Euro
What do you choose? Please make a cross at your selection:
.... up .... down
What do you think the majority of all other participants will choose in this
situation as Participant A? Please make a cross.
.... up .... down
20A.5 Decision form Responder
Decision Form Code AIZ-637-S77 Situation 3
You are Participant B. Participant B has selected ’up’ or ’down’. Now you
have to choose ’left’ or ’right’ from the row selected by Participant A.
The payoﬀ in cash will be determined as follows:
left right
up Participant A gets: 6.40 Euro Participant A gets: 6.40 Euro
Participant B gets: 0.00 Euro Participant B gets: 1.60 Euro
down Participant A gets: 4.00 Euro Participant A gets: 4.00 Euro
Participant B gets: 0.00 Euro Participant B gets: 4.00 Euro
If Participant A has selected ’up’: what do you choose? Please cross your
selection.
.... left .... right
What do you think the majority of all other participants will choose in this
situation as Participant B? Please make a cross.
.... left .... right
If Participant A has selected ’down’: what do you choose? Please cross your
selection.
.... left .... right
What do you think the majority of all other participants will choose in this
situation as Participant B? Please make a cross.
.... left .... right
21B Data
Abbreviations: ai: 1 - proposer chooses up in game Γi, 0 - proposer chooses
down in game Γi, bi: 1 - responder accepts unequal split in game Γi, 0 - respon-
der rejects unequal split in Γi, 1 - responder accepts equal split in game Γi, 0 -
responder rejects equal split in Γi.
Code a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 z1 z2 z3 z4 z5
AIZ-637-S77 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
AJK-936-D74 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AJO-184-T67 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
AKJ-429-K17 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AOW-200-E31 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ATZ-208-Y28 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
BFC-185-L23 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
BFT-473-Z91 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
BJP-240-H75 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
BPF-348-A26 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
BQX-615-Z11 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
BXE-992-N51 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
BZK-362-L64 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
BZS-733-T90 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
CHC-739-Z57 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CJK-591-K54 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
CMO-501-C57 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
COI-569-E63 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
CTG-691-E89 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
CUI-490-B80 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
DBP-462-A46 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
DHN-830-N13 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
DHS-375-D11 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
DIW-775-J58 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
DLJ-418-H39 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
DME-755-A98 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
DTL-989-K15 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
DYO-469-J64 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
EEC-112-F32 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
EGJ-883-Q35 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
EHT-543-R29 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ELY-574-Y93 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
EMG-525-G30 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
EUD-564-P55 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
EYX-572-F19 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
EZR-251-Z25 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
FFM-912-Z64 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
FLF-680-X91 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
FNZ-641-Z41 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
FOA-709-U84 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
FOR-455-K96 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
FPT-138-S72 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
GAH-563-Q98 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
GAJ-506-W32 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
GIT-242-C94 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
GKA-862-W15 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
GKX-589-H25 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
GLD-617-B45 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
GMG-800-V55 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
GMX-376-F41 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
GPD-293-K66 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
GSP-479-B36 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
GUQ-358-M17 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
GXJ-431-A73 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
HBK-300-K47 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
HCF-439-N35 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
HHR-181-W67 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
HIY-490-N16 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
HLK-982-X13 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
HOU-439-Q60 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
IAN-957-O44 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
22Code a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 z1 z2 z3 z4 z5
IBB-170-N18 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
ICD-835-W12 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
ICE-281-A10 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
IDB-785-R53 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
IHF-137-H97 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
IRD-227-B21 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
IWV-335-Q45 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
IYH-669-Z66 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
JCC-653-V95 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
JGW-834-L45 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
JGY-821-X46 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
JIA-766-S71 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
JRU-685-S91 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
JWK-118-S85 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
KNK-565-P62 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
KXM-613-V22 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
LAD-796-R29 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
LAU-610-Z54 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
LIG-663-U74 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
LLK-264-C44 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
LMF-231-T61 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
LPC-776-U66 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
LPM-468-Q13 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
LSI-309-V22 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
LVU-595-S96 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
MQT-719-T18 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
MTH-611-M57 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
MVR-789-A78 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
MYD-714-O34 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
NOD-732-J10 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
NTW-825-H20 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
NVP-209-T94 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
NYV-415-C55 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
OAB-840-Y20 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
OKI-243-W80 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
OMS-841-I66 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
OUL-801-A73 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
OWS-773-X15 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
OZR-487-P78 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
OZY-580-Q33 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
PBP-872-J98 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
PCT-852-U18 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
PDJ-160-D67 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
PFD-387-F79 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
PRO-378-B20 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
PRX-907-N24 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
PUU-923-V99 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
QAY-619-G56 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
QES-125-N95 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
QJV-160-Y75 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
QOY-442-E33 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
QQY-242-P69 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
QVV-431-J65 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
QWD-640-R12 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
QWF-860-A85 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
RAI-632-Q40 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
RGV-909-A46 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
RJE-327-G10 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
RUH-586-V63 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
RWY-992-F62 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
RYB-378-U25 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
SBA-808-Z64 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
SFC-831-Y88 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
SFD-987-L90 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
SGW-870-T12 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
SIJ-961-R81 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
SJL-434-H61 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
SLD-294-W96 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
STO-467-V68 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
SXF-480-W74 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
SZE-686-W44 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TNH-243-W63 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
TOO-458-D81 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
23Code a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 z1 z2 z3 z4 z5
TPV-433-W29 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TUA-150-S93 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
UFP-638-Y34 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
UJR-726-P64 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
UNY-473-Q20 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
URV-889-K91 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
URY-232-L57 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
VAL-234-C55 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
VEH-134-P71 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
VET-960-Z21 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
VJZ-332-X31 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
24